The Allure of Battle

"The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost" by Cathal J. Nolan is an epic examination of the idea of 'Decisive Battle' and its so-called decisiveness. His arguments are both provocative and persuasive. He asserts that political and military leaders have been enthralled by the idea of a 'decisive battle' because it promises an easy, cheap, and clear-cut victory. However, he posits that implicit faith in the concept of a decisive battle is elementally flawed. He argues that the idea has been especially attractive to leaders of weaker states or alliances, who seek to avoid a drawn-out war of attrition against more powerful foes. Nolan contends that the 'allure of battle' lies in the prospect of a swift solution: the sudden Blitzkrieg, rapid manoeuvre warfare, the brilliance of a great commander, the total defeat of the enemy on the battlefield, followed by a victorious peace. Nolan contends that this is the apparition of battles like Cannae, Agincourt, Blenheim, Waterloo, and Gettysburg. His central thesis is that a 'decisive battle' is rarely decisive.

Nolan compellingly argues that various factors—many rooted in Western cultural developments like the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Social Darwinism—have enticed leaders and nations with the allure of decisive battles. This belief posits that a brilliant general or tactical genius can achieve strategic and political objectives against larger adversaries through battlefield victories. Nolan

Jul 24 traces the origins of this notion and demonstrates its strong influence on France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, Bismarck's and Moltke's Prussia, the Kaiser's Imperial Germany, Hitler's Germany, and Imperial Japan. These powers pursued battlefield success—whether through encirclement, envelopment, or destruction—often ignoring their weaknesses in resources or manpower compared to their adversaries. Recognizing their inherent weaknesses would have led them to the conclusion that such wars have minimal political utility. Nolan shows how this illusion encouraged these powers to initiate aggressive wars without recognizing their weaknesses and led them to persist and even escalate these wars despite knowing their likely failure.

Nolan delves into the almost mythical admiration military scholars have for commanders who succeed in such engagements. He acknowledges that decisive battles can happen but convincingly argues that they are rare, and many battles believed to be decisive were not. He contends that wars are rarely won this way; instead, they are drawn-out contests of strength, attrition, and force that, as warfare has progressed, increasingly deplete the victors and devastate the losers.

". . . with few exceptions, the major power wars of the past several centuries were in the end decided by grinding exhaustion more than by the operational art of even the greatest of the modern great captains."

Nolan amplifies the benefits of defensive strategies, and the careful conservation of troops and resources is seldom celebrated. Nolan's stance directly contradicts unquestioned military theorists like Carl von Clausewitz and Alfred Thayer Mahan, who both advocated achieving victory through a major decisive engagement. Nolan's argument further portrays Napoleon as the man who doomed France by relying on increasingly limited tactical and operational successes instead of developing a long-term strategy to preserve and strengthen his state. Although Napoleon had a remarkable ten-year reign and was once the master of Europe, his lack of strategic vision and planning ultimately cost him his armies his crown and devastated France. Weaker states are often drawn to the illusion of a swift victory because their leaders recognize it as their only chance, however slim, of winning. Initial successes can sometimes mask harsh realities, as seen when the Japanese fleet swept across the Pacific and German armoured divisions cut through Europe in the early 1940s.

Jul 24 Nonetheless, Nolan contends that by 1943, German and Japanese leaders were aware that their wars were lost, as the Allies' industrial power and determination to continue fighting foreshadowed an inevitable Axis defeat.

Nolan identifies the "short-war delusion" as another major problem. This belief—that a quick and decisive battle can resolve complex political, ideological, and economic issues—is enticing. It gives smaller nations the hope of overcoming larger ones and helps governments gain popular support. However, in his view, this idea is deeply flawed.

"In the modern age, this belief has almost always led to long, exhausting wars …. Most people have been wrong in thinking wars will be short, and the reason is simple. Modern wars involve not just armies but entire societies and their collective emotions. Once blood is spilled and resources are consumed, everything changes."

Nolan does not claim his thesis is universally applicable. He acknowledges the Austro-Prussian War (1866) as an exception, where Moltke succeeded. However, he also shows that even well-known generals like Frederick II of Prussia, Napoleon, and Marlborough could not resolve significant conflicts through forceful combat. Moreover, Moltke's supposed victory in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War was a fabrication. Despite their defeat and the occupation of their capital, the French continued to resist the Prussians outside Paris and ultimately expelled them from France.

The Allure of Battle is a brilliant and remarkable piece of authorship. Numerous honours have been bestowed upon it, including the Gilder Lehrman Prize, which is given to "the best book on military history in the English-speaking world." Nolan's work is a must-read for military historians, national security experts, and any serious student of military history. It is an uncommon literary jewel with outstanding scholarship, convincing writing, and well-defined ideas. However, the book could have been improved by being shorter, as it includes excessive details about battles that may not interest the author's intended audience of non-military historians.

Additionally, there is considerable repetition. If there is another critique of a masterpiece, it is that the selection of wars for analysis is not contemporary and is

Jul 24 distinctly Europe-centric. However, to Nolan’s credit, his central argument resonates with the current Russia-Ukraine war.

Notwithstanding these minor quibbles, Nolan's book is outstanding. In a comprehensive study spanning Western military history, he situates battles within the broader conflicts in which they occurred. He debunks myths that have skewed the understanding of armed conflict, showing that battles are seldom decisive and that generals are rarely true geniuses, resulting in rarely short or inexpensive wars. Nolan replaces popular misconceptions with a more sombre reality. This challenging and controversial book deserves to be read and contemplated by those professionally involved or interested in military history, strategy, and international relations.

My Rating 5/5

Jul 24