World on the Brink

The provocatively titled book is a clarion call for the U.S. to marshal its resources to address 'America's top foreign policy challenge – its China problem.' His central Thesis is that China has the potential to challenge America; however, it is far from being a country that can currently match it. He observes that it is only in the final years of the Obama administration that America has woken up to the China- challenge. There is a growing realisation that the Chinese goals of rejuvenation of China and its reunification with Taiwan can potentially upend peace and stability in the world.

Alperovitch begins by outlining the period right after the Second World War when General George Marshall was tasked to bring China into the democratic block, but Mao's success led to the creation of the People's Republic of China. He describes the varying approaches of the U.S. towards China under Truman, Roosevelt, Nixon and Carter, from boosting its great power status to global isolation to its reopening in 1972, de-recognition of Taiwan and finally, integration with international trade structures. The ongoing competition between the two nations starkly contrasts the positivity under Nixon as he proclaimed, "We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations". Ironically, Chinese intentions duly recognised by Nixon to build their credentials, grab Taiwan and 'get the U.S out of Asia' have not altered since. Preoccupied with building an anti-Soviet coalition, the Carter administration in 1978 derecognised Taiwan and echoed the Chinese one-China policy. The Clinton era witnessed the integration of the U.S. and Chinese economies and the gifting of WTO membership to China. Furthermore, the 1999 Kosovo war informed the Chinese that an inferior army could wage a battle against a capable high-tech adversary. By the early 2000s, an economically rising China began to assert itself, and the world came face to face with Chinese salami-slicing tactics as China militarised the South China Sea and made claims to an extended ADIZ.

Setting the scene for the China problem, Alperovitch dissects the U.S. response to the war in Ukraine and highlights how the West failed to read Russian intentions despite Putin having articulated it on multiple occasions. He argues that similarly, the U.S has been 'distracted and disoriented' while China has been on a steady path of creating the circumstances and restoring its power to challenge the U.S. China has engaged in industrial espionage, manipulated international institutions, enhanced its military might and slowly but steadily altered the status quo within the first Island chain and the South China Sea. He posits that the U.S. needs to scale back its global commitments and focus on the China challenge. Alperovitch argues that countering Russia in Ukraine should not become a case for overextension, adversely affecting the ability to address the more significant China challenge.

Alperovitch analyses Putin's approach to Ukraine and attempts to correlate his actions with Xi Jinping's actions. He argues that the reasons put forward by Putin to justify the Ukraine war are a smoke cloud. Putin was driven by the desire to restore Russia's glory. Much like Xi, Putin was surrounded by loyalists who never presented an alternate view and made his decisions in an echo chamber. Putin might have taken an enormous risk when the world felt he wouldn't bite the bullet. Xi has similar designs for Taiwan. Xi Jinping's desire to reunify Taiwan is driven by 'history, destiny, security, geography and ego'.

The book's heart lies in the sections where he outlines Chinese and Russian vulnerabilities and U.S. strengths and proposes a U.S. strategy to counter China. Alperovitch argues that Russia's declining demographics, stagnating economy and depleted military will significantly diminish its stature and relevance. He argues that Russia is transitioning to a more prominent and northern North Korea than a peer competitor of the U.S.

On China, Alperovitch argues that Xi's promise of national rejuvenation and the Chinese dream is experiencing headwinds like never before. He posits that the Chinese boom has been fuelled by 'workers, capital, resources and willing trading partners- all four categories appear increasingly exhausted.' China is on the edge of a demographic precipice, with fertility rates down to as low as 1.3 children per woman.1 The dramatic population reduction will have far-reaching social, economic and geopolitical consequences. The Chinese economy is straining at the seams, with rising debt slowing internal growth and the real estate-driven economy failing.2 The initial euphoria associated with BRI is being replaced by growing scepticism for Chinese work quality and debt diplomacy, which underline that 'loyalty of people or countries is not available for permanent purchase.' Chinese wolf-warrior diplomacy has further added to the realisation that the story of China's peaceful rise is a myth. It is becoming increasingly more challenging for China to guarantee resources for its economy, unlike the U.S., which grew into an economic powerhouse without any threats to the mainland U.S. However, China faces a charged security scenario centred on military tensions linked to the reunification of Taiwan coupled with the instability of the Korean peninsula and tensions in the South China Sea.

Alperovitch argues that, unlike China, the U.S. strength and resilience flow from the "Five I's": immigration, innovation, investment, influence, and ideas. America is the land of dreams powered by endless opportunity and the finest education.3 The American ecosystem inherently breeds innovation, provides easy access to capital and supports businesses, making it the home to the leading companies across 'technology, energy, pharmaceutical, automotive, industrial, agricultural and financial sectors.' The ability of the U.S. to project economic, military and diplomatic power across the globe cannot be paralleled by any country. U.S. global influence is enabled by its ability to evolve, ideate, adapt and nurture ideas in a manner that most autocratic regimes cannot. The U.S. has the global lead on matters ideational to material, and the strategy to counter China involves retaining this lead and hindering Chinese growth. Alperovitch concludes his book by proposing a four-stage strategy to consolidate the U.S. position and constrain China's rise.

1 2.1 children per woman is the fertility rate required to sustain the population. 2 Real estate contributes 30% to the Chinese GDP and the Chinese housing sector is plagued by unviable projects. 3 Notwithstanding universities such as Tsinghua, Xi Jinping’s daughter Xi Mingze graduated from Harvard under an assumed name.

Step-One – 'Enable innovation'. Alperovitch proposes a four-pronged approach to prevent China from achieving a "Chip Breakout". He outlines methods to limit Chinese access to advanced technology such as AI, autonomy, biotech, synthetic biology, space tech, and green tech. He posits that a race for critical elements such as copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, manganese and the set of seventeen socalled rare earth elements is on, and the U.S. must chart a path to ensure their steady supply while reducing dependency on China.

Step – Two – 'Defend Innovation'. Alperovitch argues that the U.S. needs to retool itself to address the China challenge. The authors say that the Pentagon has not developed the appropriate mix of weapons to counter a "peer adversary" like China. He posits that the U.S. relies too heavily on expensive, advanced weapons systems produced in small numbers, neglecting simpler, cost-effective options needed in larger quantities. The ongoing war in Ukraine is cited as a clear example of the relevance of this issue. Additionally, the authors call for more robust measures to protect intellectual property from Chinese cyberattacks.

Steps Three and Four are 'Say Yes to Our Friends' and 'Say No to Distractions.' The authors stress the importance of bolstering alliances and supporting allies facing Chinese coercion, whether through military actions, like China's aggression in the South China Sea, or economic punishment for opposing Chinese policies. They propose creating a Treaty of Allied Market Economies (TAME) to link European and Asia-Pacific economies. The treaty would include an "Article 5" provision, triggering joint trade barriers, sanctions, and export controls against any aggressor targeting a member. Regarding distractions, the authors call for a reassessment of U.S. relations with Russia through the lens of countering China, emphasising that while Russia remains a significant player, U.S. policy should prioritise long-term strategic goals. They call out the excessive utilisation of resources in Ukraine and its long-term adverse consequences in countering China. He also makes a persuasive case for Taiwan to do more and prepare itself militarily to thwart a Chinese reunification bid as the U.S. buys time day by day, week by week, year by year, underlining that the Chinese reunification of Taiwan is not possible and militarily suicidal.

Overall, it is a well-researched book with a clear-eyed assessment of the U.S.'s and their allies' options to counter a rising China. The narrative is a fine marriage of history, economics, geopolitics and technology. The book and its strategies are a call to action for U.S. policymakers. It is a worthy read for all interested in geopolitics.