Anger Management

The title of the book alludes to a self-help book that many are loathe to; however, this is a book about managing the core feeling of ‘anger’ that often overlays the relationship between India and Pakistan. There are innumerable books on the aggravated relationship between India and Pakistan, and the first question that will be on most readers' minds is what else is there to be told. The simple answer emanating from Bisaria’s book is “a lot”. Bisaria, as an ex-diplomat, brings the practitioners' view to the discourse and provides a refreshingly enriching evaluation of the weft and warp of this vexed relationship peppered with remarkable tales of behindthe-scenes diplomacy.

Besides harnessing his own experience, Bisaria reaches out to the memoirs and accounts of other diplomats who have served in Pakistan. The prologue begins with his expulsion from Pakistan as Article 370 is revoked by India. The story is laid out in periods of a decade, each beginning from 1947 to 2017, and the final section is from 2017 to 2023.

In the section titled “ Building States” Bisaria describes the fledgling steps taken by both nations after independence, how Sri Prakasa, the first High Commissioner to Pakistan was appointed, and how Indian diplomacy began to find its feet in the bloody mess of the partition. It was a profoundly perplexing human tragedy with the Embassy grappling with death and destruction and the fate of the refugees. Interestingly, until 1952 no passports were needed to travel to Pakistan. His examination of the topsecret Operation Gulmarg and the accession of Kashmir to India is factually told while highlighting several layers of British misdemeanour. The logjams of the first couple of years of diplomacy had seemed impossible to break. The early disputes included the control and occupation of Kashmir, settling the question of control over Indus Water Canals, evacuee property, division of assets, and the financial settlement to be completed between the two countries. All these dimensions are rather well-researched and enunciated. As a side note, it was startling to learn that Pakistan’s Head of State presided as the Chief Guest for the Republic Day Parade in 1955. The section ends with the deliberations in the UN after the Constituent Assembly of Jammu Kashmir adopted a resolution making the state an integral part of the Indian Union.

By 1957, Pakistan had all the makings of a garrison state. Interestingly, a nowar proposal was deliberated between the two nations without any conclusive agreement. The argument was that had Jinnah survived another five or six years, he may have pursued his vision of a common security concept for two sovereign and friendly states. The Indus Water Treaty was concluded in 1960 and both sides were unhappy with its eventual shape. Bisaria vividly describes Nehru’s visit to Pakistan in 1960, strangely the then High Commissioner Rajeshwar Dayal was in Congo for a UNSG special representative, Ayub was miffed and bitterly told Dayal that the Indian government considered Congo more important than Pakistan. Nevertheless, Nehru erred during the visit in not having a complete discussion on Kashmir. Arguably, a conversation between India’s democratic leader and Pakistan’s dictator, both domestically strong could have averted war five years later. The chasm between Indian and Pakistani positions on Kashmir widened by 1963. Bisaria’s description of the clash in the Rann of Kutch and the 1965 War is on point. The diplomatic machinery ticking in the background of the conflict has been vividly captured. It was disquieting to read the treatment meted out to the members of the Indian High Commission during the 1965 war. Bisaria chronicles the shocking treatment meted out to the diplomats and their families. The High Commissioner Kewal Singh was literally under house arrest for 20 days, while astonishingly not a single communication was received from Delhi. Singh was livid with Delhi’s conduct and on his return post-war took this matter up with the Prime Minister. His analysis of the peace agreement in Tashkent is evenhanded highlighting the political compulsions and the eventual compromise in surrendering large tracts of land acquired by the immense sacrifice of men who fought to their last breath.

Bisaria thereafter transitions to the war of 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh. The analysis of the war, the geopolitics, war termination, and the Shimla Agreement is incisive and poised. He argues that by converting the ceasefire line in Kashmir to a Line of Control that would gradually assume the characteristics of an international border the decision-makers of the day saw prospects of an eventual settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Bhutto had then stated that ‘an agreement will emerge in the foreseeable future. It will evolve into a settlement. Let there be a line of peace; let people come and go; let us not fight over it’. By 1973 these promises had vapourised and Bhutto was championing a 1000-year war against India. On 18 May 1974, ‘Buddha smiled’ and Bhutto professed to build the bomb even if Pakistan had to eat grass. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan gave Pakistan a key strategic role as a frontline state in the Cold War and opened doors for Western military aid. More dangerously, it led the U.S. to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s covert China-supported nuclear weapons program. By the 1980s, Pakistan had begun fanning the flames of separatism in Punjab. Pakistan trained and used its land as a staging post for the insurgency, with Rawalpindi becoming the nerve centre of the operation to destabilise India.

Bisaria captures the essence of Operation Meghdoot and how India grabbed the opportunity that arose from a cartographic error to seize the Saltoro Ridge and the Siachen Glacier in April 1984. However, the revenge for Siachen became a driver for many a Kargil plan. Zia’s death brought Benazir Bhutto to the fore but the bilateral relations continued to ebb and flow. When the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in the summer of 1989, the global Jihadis were turned towards Kashmir and thus began the ISI’s Kashmir adventure code-named Operation Tupac. Soon the Kashmir insurgency intensified, multiple terrorist groups mushroomed and Kashmiri Hindus were targeted with impunity. Within a few months of 1990, close to 100,000 of the valley’s 140,000-strong Kashmiri Pandit community fled to Jammu, Delhi, and other parts of India and the world. In February there was an audacious movement of Pakistani citizens marching into Kashmir from POK twice at Chakothi and near Sialkot. Kashmir would be up in flames for many a decade from there on. Bisaria recounts the intense reactions in Pakistan to the demolition of Babri Masjid and how Indian diplomats almost lost their lives. Eventually, this led to the consulate in Karachi being shut down.

In the section titled, ‘ 1997-2007 Nuclear Games’ Bisaria chronicles the events leading up to Pokhran II and the Pakistani response. In the shadow of the struggle for strategic parity mushroomed Vajpayee’s famous bus journey to Lahore. The visit of 1999 generated hope and it appeared that a new page had been turned over however hope was shortlived. Pakistan once again pandered to Sikh separatists and there was no let up on its malevolent designs on Kashmir. On 3rd May 1999, the first signs of incursion in Kargil were reported. Bisaria’s account of the Kargil War is wellresearched and cogently articulated. His description of the intense behind-the-scenes diplomacy for war termination and saving Nawaz Sharif’s political capital have been grippingly narrated. In a short span of 13 months, the Vajpayee government had witnessed the nuclear explosion, undertaken the Lahore visit, and won the Kargil war. The 9/11 attack put Pakistan under the lens as the terrorists who carried out the attack were trained in Pakistan. However, as regards GWOT nothing was possible in Afghanistan without the support of Pakistan. Ironically, the country that was the fountain of terrorism in the region was recruited to exterminate terrorism. As proof of its complicity, the attacks on the J&K Legislative Assembly and the Parliament followed. India responded with Op Parakram, a futile act of so-called coercive diplomacy. The blow-hot and blow-cold relationship continued with the usual cycle of terror acts by Pakistan followed by stern words by India coupled with, mutual diplomatic withdrawals and smearing of each other at international fora.

Bisaria’s description of the Mumbai terror attacks is detailed and replete with insight. He argues that in 2008, the Pakistani civilian leadership was definitely unaware of the planning and the conduct of the events. Much the same happened when Bin Laden was executed on Pakistani soil. The Mumbai attack and its aftermath dwarfed all the bilateral issues and became the defining event of the decade. Bisaria postulates that had the response to 2008 been different and more forceful, it could have served as a disincentive for attacks that would follow later on in Pathankot, Uri, and Pulwama.

In the closing section of the book Bisaria captures the new zero-tolerance policy for terror attacks originating from Pakistan and outlines India’s responses post the Uri and Pulwama terror attacks. The chapter on Pulwama is rather well written, more so as he was the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan at the time. The decisionmaking leading to the strikes, Pakistan’s internal messaging, the response from Pakistan, the risks of escalation, the intense diplomatic parleys, and the release of Wing Commander Abhinandan have been captivatingly detailed. He terminates the section with a balanced discussion on the revocation of Article 370 circling back to the beginning of the book.

In conclusion, he presents ten-dimensional constants to the vexed relationship between the two countries, namely, security matters and the relationship is heavily ‘ securitized’, leadership matters in terms of political stability and heft, diplomacy matters to prevent the pot from boiling away, global forces matter by their latent and many a time active pressure on both nations, multilateral institutions matter for quite the similar reasons, people matter, the territorial disagreements will never go away, Pakistan’s structure as a garrison state cannot be wished away, economic relations don’t count for much, and lastly minority issues continue to fan emotion and draw emotive reactions. Bisaria argues that “sustained engagement with Pakistan’s Army, through quiet and direct channels is critical given the reality that Army is the primary determinant of Pakistan’s India policy”. Over time India has realised that in this elaborate game of Snakes and Ladders, the snakes are both conflicts and terror attacks. However, there appears to be a growing recognition in Pakistan that after Pulwama it is certainly not going to be business as usual. Peering into the crystal ball, Bisaria closes with three possible future outlooks; “business as usual, conditional optimism, and conditional pessimism”.

Overall, a fascinating book that is a delightful union of narrative history backed by fine research and astute scholarship. His examination of major events and every peace-making venture that has shaped the relationship between the two nations is replete with telling revelations, enthralling anecdotes, captivating memoirs, and enriching history. He offers no magic bullet for an era of lasting peace and well-being however; he does offer a richly informed assessment for a more cautious foretelling of the future. Anger Management is a tale well told, that deserves a place of high recognition amongst the books written on the torturous relationship between India and Pakistan.