How States Think

John Mearsheimer's and Sebastian Rosato's work offers a well-crafted and insightful exploration of a crucial question in international relations: Are states truly rational actors? Does empirical evidence show consistent rationality or non-rationality in state behaviour? This issue is essential for academic study and practical application of international politics. Rosato and his co-author argue that "only if states are rational can scholars and policymakers understand and predict their behaviour."

The book argues that rational decisions in international politics are based on credible theories about how the world operates and result from deliberative decisionmaking processes. Rosato and Mearsheimer, a staunch advocate of great-power politics, assert that most states are rational. The authors focus on the rationality of the foreign-policy decision-making process (instrumental rationality) rather than its goals or outcomes. They argue that humans are fundamentally theoretical (homotheoreticus), with their understanding of how the world operates, guiding their decisions during crises and formulating grand strategies. They find theories based on "expected utility maximization" flawed in understanding state rationality in international affairs.

June 24 According to the authors, most states often act rationally when developing grand strategies and managing crises. They contend that ten cases traditionally viewed as irrational decision-making are examples of rational decision-making. These include America's pursuit of Liberal Hegemony after the Cold War, NATO's expansion post- Cold War, and policies toward Europe after World War II and East Asia after the Cold War. European cases include Germany's decisions to start World War I and invade the Soviet Union during World War II, as well as Japan's decision to attack the US at Pearl Harbour.

However, states do not always act rationally. The authors discuss four cases of "nonrational state behaviour," such as America's Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba in 1961 and its decision to invade Iraq in 2003. In these instances, small groups of high-level officials hijacked the decision-making process, preventing thorough deliberation. Nonrational choices can also result from non-credible or irrational theories like the domino theory, racial theories, and the clash of civilizations or from non-theoretical thinking such as analogies and heuristics. They argue that "the historical record reveals that most states are rational most of the time" and emphasize that rationality should not be conflated with success or morality. Rational policies can sometimes breach widely accepted ethical standards and may be unjust.

Regarding the role of emotions in policymaking, the authors acknowledge that decision-makers are occasionally driven more by emotions than theories. They cite experts like neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, who believes emotions are integral to rational thought, typically working in tandem with reason. However, Mearsheimer and Rosato conclude that such emotional dominance is rare, a point that may not fully align with the evidence. By downplaying emotions in decision-making, they risk echoing traditional international relations theorists who often depicted the state as a purely rational entity, uninfluenced by emotions in its international dealings.

In reality, inter-state dynamics are more complex. States can be rational, selfinterested actors, but examining state rationality and egoism reveals a more intricate picture. Understanding the balance between rationality and emotionality in interstate and transnational affairs requires an appreciation of human nature's fundamental tenets, a topic extensively debated throughout history. Philosophers like Aristotle and Plato acknowledged the interplay between reason and emotion, with modern insights

June 24 from neurobiology and behavioural studies offering a deeper understanding of this relationship. Major historical events cannot be fully understood without recognizing their emotional drivers. Nationalism, for example, is deeply rooted in emotions, influenced by symbols, myths, and perceived historical injustices. Emotional motivations have shaped many geopolitical events, such as Hitler's insistence on signing the 1940 armistice in the exact location of Germany's World War I defeat.

Mearsheimer and Rosato conclude with a somewhat pessimistic view of international relations, but I believe there is room for cautious optimism. Humanity can move towards a more peaceful and prosperous world by mitigating excessive emotionality and extractive egoism in global affairs. This requires breaking away from zero-sum paradigms and embracing pragmatic, win-win competition rooted in Symbiotic Realism and Multi-Sum Security, which account for human nature's neurobiological aspects and our interconnected world. Furthermore, they do not discuss many issues that would make gathering evidence for rational policymaking difficult, such as North Korea, Taiwan, trade protectionism, etc. Their 'Offensive realism' leanings are also front and centre throughout the book.1

The book's emphasis on rationality frequently overlooks state actions' ethical and moral implications. A comprehensive understanding of state behaviour must include an analysis of both rationality and the moral and ethical dimensions of decisions, particularly when rational policies lead to unjust or unethical outcomes.

However, "How States Think" is a valuable addition to Mearsheimer's body of work, stressing the importance of not dismissing disliked policies as irrational. However, it is equally important to recognize the central role of emotions and egoism in decision-making, alongwith the interplay of their moral and ethical dimensions.

My Rating 4/5

1 A very fine book discussion is available at htips://www.youtube.com/live/l3sPXKW_t9c?si=MjVBR69dtirvpk7Tf

June 24