The Limits of Power

In his 2008 publication "The Limits of Power," Andrew J. Bacevich, a former U.S. Army colonel and professor specialising in history and international relations at Boston University, examines the American foreign policy, especially concerning the long wars and the failed efforts of America to bring the notion of U.S. order to these regions. Incidentally, although the book appears dated regarding the continuation of the Long War, the central arguments continue to resonate. Bacevich deconstructs American foreign policy in light of the extended and failed commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. He argues that the American notion of foreign policy centred on a moral and just war is farcical. The Limits of Power adopts a perspective reminiscent of Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), who argued similarly decades ago. Niebuhr, a theologian, pastor and activist, foresaw America's predicament with remarkable accuracy. Hubris, opposing realism, appears to have exaggerated confidence in the effectiveness of American power in reshaping the global order, which was evident in both Niebuhr's time and today. Humility, on the other hand, enables a more inclusive foreign policy.

His analysis is spread over three chapters, targeting American profligacy, failed political leadership and military ineptness. Chapter 1, "The Crisis of Profligacy," is centred around the argument that Americans have a sense of entitlement that leads to a skewed materialistic view of the world. Over time, the idea of America as the flagbearer of global idealism has been reinforced by political rhetoric and military adventurism. 8 May 2024

Bacevich argues that nations and institutions need not settle for the idea of the world as eschewed by the U.S. In July 1979, Jimmy Carter delivered two pivotal speeches urging the United States to rethink and give up its quest for endlessly more. Carter proposed a six-point programme to reduce foreign dependency but his speech met with little enthusiasm and was soon labelled as the 'malaise speech'. Subsequent presidents espoused what the American public wanted to hear: the undiluted power of America to reshape the world and protect American interests cloaked with the interests of the world. His misunderstandings about military strength, originally advanced during Reagan's tenure, endured beyond his presidency. Pursuing unchallenged global military supremacy remained a consistent objective, with anything less than complete dominance seen as perilously inadequate by the Pentagon. The long wars of Iraq and Afghanistan are evidence of this malaise. Any sane plea for the U.S. to pull back is met with shrill concerns of Isolationism. Bacevich argues that "the fiasco of the Iraq War and the quasi-permanent U.S. occupation of Afghanistan" are festering wounds of American profligacy.

In Chapter 2, titled "The Political Crisis", Bacevich examines the internal dynamics of Washington to uncover the roots of the present unrest in the United States. He argues that the country has maintained a preparedness posture for war since the presidency of Harry S. Truman, during which time authority has increasingly centralised within the executive branch. Congress has seen its role diminished in determining military actions. He asserts that nothing has ever changed in Washington, leading to four foundational convictions: the belief in a meaningful historical trajectory, the concept of the United States as a beacon of liberty, the firm belief that God tasks Americans to advance this freedom, and the notion that genuine security for the nation will only come with the universal prevalence of American values. Bacevich opines that, unfortunately, these beliefs have entrenched themselves among a closeknit group loyal to the president, significantly limiting the scope of foreign policy options. With military backing, this rigid ideology has inclined decision-makers to view America's interactions with the world predominantly through a military perspective. Bacevich credits James Forrestal, the first U.S. Secretary of Defence in 1949, with initiating the 8 May 2024

militarised mindset. He follows this legacy through the beliefs of Paul Nitze and, eventually, Paul Wolfowitz. Bacevich firmly argues that the logical progression of this mindset led to the doctrine of preventive war, which justified the Iraq invasion. He warns that this action jeopardises the longterm integrity of the United States' domestic and international interests.

In the penultimate chapter of his book, "The Military Crisis", Bacevich exposes the damaging culture of entitlement and limited viewpoints pervasive among policymakers and within the military establishment. He contends that despite American soldiers demonstrating exceptional bravery, their effectiveness has been significantly compromised due to incompetent leadership, both in the political and military realms. His criticism of American generalship is scathing; he contends that since the Cold War, "the quality of American generals has been mediocre." He opines that the fascination with technological supremacy has led to the slow death of U.S. senior military leadership and initiative. He argues that the protracted wars have highlighted multiple American fallacies that technological superiority wins wars and that military supremacy in numbers is the crucial determinant of victory. He posits that "The exercise of military power will not enable the United States to evade the predicament to which the crisis of profligacy has given rise. To persist in following that path invites inevitable overextension, bankruptcy, and ruin."

The core argument of Bacevich is that "rather than acknowledging that American power is not limitless, [ Americans] pursue policies that actually accelerate the depletion of that power". The book is refreshing for its very different take on American exceptionalism from the more traditional views of power centres within Washington. He correctly points out that all those who have voiced views similarly have been labelled as messengers of an American return to Isolationism. However, his argument is more nuanced; he suggests that knowing the limits of power prevents over-extension and the scourge of unending long wars and heralds a much-required calibration of resources. His book is a clarion call for America to stop searching for America-led military solutions to global problems.

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However, the recommendations stand on feeble ground. Bacevich broadly suggests four remedies to American troubles: reforming American foreign policy by revisiting the erstwhile notion of containment versus nation-building especially concerning the Middle East, prioritising energy independence and addressing climate change, and advocating the abolition of nuclear weapons. The more significant issues that he has outlined in each chapter, i.e. the overtly military involvement of America in world affairs, the weak structure of American policymaking, both military and political, the military missteps, the gargantuan American bureaucracy with little to speak of as achievements and the profligacy of the American way of life are primarily left untouched without any strong policy recommendations. A further downside of the book is the excessive use of rhetoric, which is off-putting and reduces the academic value of the book.1

On the one hand, the book is about American exceptionalism, and on the other, Bacevich professes a new form of exceptionalism where America picks and chooses places of engagement on a different set of calculations. Overall, it is an entertaining and thought-provoking book that stakes a claim for readership more for its novelty of arguments than its academic treatment.

My rating

1 A cita'on for 284 toilets in Pentagon is quite a stretch for a book on American foreign policy