The Twilight War

David Crist’s book “ Twilight War - The Secret History of America’s Thirty Year Conflict with Iran,” outlines the origins and background of the conflict and details the numerous military confrontations that have brought the U.S. and Iran to the brink of outright war several times. Crist chose the word, ‘Twilight’ in the title as a metaphor for the current state of affairs between the United States and Iran. With their frayed diplomatic ties and occasional meetings through shadowy intermediaries, neither side has a truthful view of the other, something like the dark images in the twilight hour.

The narrative begins in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah and thus omits a discussion of American participation (via clandestine operations of the CIA) in the coup that overthrew the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed the Shah in 1953. This omission is hard to justify; it is an important element in understanding the intense hatred of the United States that motivated Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and many of the students who overran the American Embassy and precipitated the hostage crisis for 444 days during the Jimmy Carter presidency. This period also witnessed the botched rescue attempt by the U.S. special forces. Crist does well to capture the mood in Iran, the sharp geopolitical turns during the Islamic Revolution, and the untimely refuge by the U.S. to the Shah in the aftermath of the revolution triggering the hostage crisis.

The Iranian crisis led to the crystallisation of the Persian Gulf Security Framework and the eventual creation of CENTCOM after the enactment of the Goldwater Nichols Act. Realising the magnitude of the Iranian situation and the decimation of all HUMINT U.S. began investing in spy networks within Iran. Meanwhile, Iran sought unconventional solutions to security challenges with the People’s Army becoming a reality in May 1979. Officially it became known as the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, or Sepah-e Pasdaran in Farsi. In English, it has since been simply labelled the Revolutionary Guard.

The U.S. was slow to recognise how implacable an enemy was the clerical regime in Iran because the Americans were worried more about Soviet intervention than the rise of an unallied adversary. While the U.S. did not know of Iraq’s plan to invade Iran in 1980 they tacitly supported Iraq’s invasion of Iran out of the hatred generated by the hostage crisis. Iran viewed this as a proxy war with the U.S. calling the shots. Israel’s poorly thought-out invasion of Lebanon hastened Iran’s development of its proxies, most notably Hezbollah. The 241 American servicemen and 58 French para-troopers died in the truck bomb attack on the Infantry Battalion Headquarters building in Beirut. The U.S. never could attribute the attack to Iran and Reagan vacillated on retribution.

Meanwhile, the Iran- Iraq war gathered a new dimension. Iraq started targeting Iranian oil and Iran couldn’t hit Iraqi oil as it largely flowed over land so chose to target tankers of countries supporting Iraq. The U.S. wanted to make sure oil kept flowing through the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, despite Iran’s efforts to prevent Iraq’s allies, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, from using those waters to transport petroleum. Thus began the saga of the Tanker Wars. The Iranians used outposts in the Persian Gulf to attack Kuwaiti and Saudi hulls eventually led to the convoying by U.S. warships and the mining response of the IRGC. The Persian Gulf became a battleground between Iran and the U.S. A mere mention of the military events at the time is breath-taking with USS Stark being hit by Iraqi jets, Seals storming Iranian ship Iran Ajir, attacks on Iranian oil platforms that served as outposts for attacking tankers and harassing U.S. warships, sinking of the Iranian warship Sahand, shooting down of Iranian flight 655 by USS Vincennes, mine blowing a hole in U.S.S Samuel B Roberts, and the all but successful IRGC attack on Saudi Arabia to name just a few. Crist captures the military episodes of this asymmetric fight brilliantly by drawing on the personal accounts of the actors involved.

Meanwhile, Iranian armed and financed surrogates like Hezbollah and Shiite Iraqi insurgents continued to carry out successful terrorist attacks against American targets such as the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. When Iraq started losing, the U.S. shared critical intelligence which was key to preventing Iraqi defeat, and even allowed Iraq to take the offensive eventually forcing Iran to agree to peace in 1988.

Crist spends a considerable portion of his discourse examining the White House’s response over subsequent presidencies. He is especially critical of Ronald Reagan’s handling of Iran. He argues that Reagan was too empathetic toward hostages held by Iranian surrogates, and found himself out-negotiated. Crist is not especially favourable about Jimmy Carter either, he also rates George W. Bush lowly for focusing on the moral iniquity of Iran, a position bound to add nothing but further alienation.

Moreover, despite the belief that they would avoid the mistakes of their predecessors, both Democratic and Republican administrations have found themselves grappling with many of the same challenges: searching for elusive Iranian moderates, deciding whether to engage or confront Tehran, clarifying Iranian intentions, and, most important, failing to establish clear consensus in Washington regarding the means and ends of policy toward Iran. Even in the face of clear, profound differences between the two countries, most U.S. administrations have been internally divided regarding their goals in Iran, with some factions seeking to work with the regime in Tehran and others seeking its overthrow. At times, the White House has been unable to decide between these competing views, resulting in policy drift. These internal differences have also repeatedly complicated efforts to bridge differences with Iran. Notably, Gen Mattis’s musings highlighting the discordant notes of foreign policy led to his departure from CENTCOM four months before time.

Furthermore, while they have been loath to admit it, many presidents have benefitted from the policies of their predecessors. Reagan largely continued Carter's policy of strengthening U.S. ties with Arab states to contain Iran. Obama benefitted from Bush's "Iran Action Plan" and continued the latter's efforts to develop a missile defense shield in the Gulf. This underscores the degree to which successive administrations have faced similar challenges in Iran and devised similar solutions. Crist argues the U.S. has also consistently faltered in the face of Iranian aggression. The 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, the use of Iranian proxy groups to undermine U.S. efforts in Iraq, and the 2011 attempted assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington were all met with insufficient responses. Crist opines that the Iranian leaders see this lack of swift retribution as an invitation to continue proxy warfare against the United States. They know that these actions cross U.S. red lines, and they have maintained a pragmatic approach to testing Washington's temperament.

Some readers may criticize Crist's lack of detail on the complex history of Iran during the reign of the American-supported shah. Crist explains his decision to pick up the story of U.S.-Iranian relations at the time of the Iranian Revolution because these were the years of direct conflict and competition with Iran. This decision allows for a more focused examination of the regime, as well as the events that are currently shaping our world. However, those interested in pre-revolutionary U.S.-Iranian relations may wish to read Stephen Kinzer's, All the Shah's Men (Wiley Press, 2008).

The book is considerably more detailed in its treatment of Carter, Reagan, and George. W. Bush administrations than their successors. This imbalance may be the result of many factors, such as a more overt U.S.-Iranian antagonism during that early period, and better access to declassified and open-source information from the 1980s. Whatever the reason, the unevenness is noticeable and may give the inadvertent impression that Iran has been less of a foreign policy quandary in the past two decades. Additionally, one may argue that the book lacks adequate depth of analysis from an Iranian perspective, this may also be a result of the insufficient resources on that count. Finally, the work is at times unnecessarily personal, even chatty. While I much enjoyed the anecdotal description of the military interactions, some of the very personal habits and characteristics of the actors distract from the otherwise purposeful narrative.

Despite these seemingly minor flaws, at close to 600 pages The Twilight War is an extremely impressive work. What distinguishes this book is its broad scope and ability to incorporate an extensive history into a cohesive, convincing narrative. I am convinced that this book will leave the reader historically enriched with a broad-based understanding of the tortured past that the two nations share and the challenges in finding a settlement for a better tomorrow.

I strongly recommend it to anyone interested in engaging with the troubled history of U.S.-Iranian relations and the influence of the conflict on the broader Middle East.